People ex rel. Averna v. Palm Springs [DISSENT] by Carter, Jesse W.
Golden Gate University School of Law
GGU Law Digital Commons
Jesse Carter Opinions The Jesse Carter Collection
10-24-1958
People ex rel. Averna v. Palm Springs [DISSENT]
Jesse W. Carter
Supreme Court of California
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions
Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Jesse Carter Collection at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Jesse Carter Opinions by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carter, Jesse W., "People ex rel. Averna v. Palm Springs [DISSENT]" (1958). Jesse Carter Opinions. Paper 25.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions/25
38 
A. No. 24796. In Bank. Od. 
THE PEOPLE ex rel. JOHN A VBHNA et a1., Appellant, v. 
CITY OF PALM SPHINGS, Respondent. 
[1] Municipal Corporations-Annexation-Validity.- Quo war-
ranto lies to attack a completed annexation proceeding. 
[2] Quo Warranto-Pleading.-A complaint in quo warranto is 
sufficient if it charges the usurpation of a franchise in gen-
eral terms. 
[3a, 3b] Id.- Burden of Proof: Pleading- Demurrer. If the 
pleader in quo warranto sets out the specific facts relied on 
to show a usurpation, he assumes the burden of allegation 
and proof, and the complaint is subject to general demurrer 
if those facts do not state a cause of action. If plaintiff docs 
not contend that any additional grounds arc available, it is 
not error to deny leave to amend. 
[ 4] !d.-Pleading.-A request that existing rules he revised to 
require specific allegations in all cases where a quo warranto 
action is brought on relation of private parties should he ad-
dressed to the Legislature, not the Supreme Court. 
[5] Municipal Corporations-Annexation of Uninhabited Territory 
-Pleading.-In a proceeding in quo warranto to test the 
validity of annexation of uninhabited territory to a city, 
plaintiff's allegation that failure to serve a certain corporate 
landowner in the territory with written notice of its oppor-
tunity to protest the annexation deprived the city council of 
jurisdiction to annex the territory was fatally deficient, where 
plaintiff did not allege that the city failed to mail written 
notice to all other landowners in the annexed territory, that 
the requirements of Gov. Code, § 35311, for publication of no-
tice were not observed, that the landowner did not acquire 
knowledge of the contents of the published notice, that the 
landowner did not appear at the hearing, that it desired to 
protest, or that its protest, if any, was not in fact considE~rcd. 
[6] !d.-Annexation of Uninhabited Territory-Notice and Hear-
ing.-Where the notice of hearing for annexation of nnin-
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Municipal Corporations, § 82 ct seq.; Am. 
Jur., Municipal Corporations, § 23. 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Quo Warranto, § 22; Am.Jur., (~uo War-
ranto,§ 89. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Municipal Corporations, § 43; [2, 4] 
Quo Warranto, § 17; [3] Quo Warranto, §§ 18, 23; [5-7, 9-12, 14, 
15, 17] Municipal Corporations, § 56.5; [8] Real Property; [13] 
Municipal Corporations, § 24; [16] Taxation, §§ 25, 94. 
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to a city that the council would 
determine "all written protests filed with the City 
Connci! to thP hour" set for hearing, no complaint could 
lw made of the adequacy of the notice if the city wns justified 
to entertain protests not submitted in the form 
at the time 
!d.--Annexation of Uninhabited Territory-Protests.-··Gov. 
CcHlc ~ :JiJ::ll2, deelnriug that at any time "before" the hour set 
. to annexation of uninhabited territory 
t 0 n eit;v ;wy ownPr of property within the territory may file 
'·writteu" jJrote;;t, means tlwt only written protRsts J1led before 
tl 1e hour set for hearing need be considered; the word "may" 
only to the extent that no one is required to file 
!8] Real Property-Defini.tions.-"Land'' Hw:ms "the solid material 
of the earth" ( Civ. Code,§ 659), and its value does not include 
the vahw of improvements thereon. 
[9] Municipal Corporations-Annexation of Uninhabited Territory 
-Protests.---The HJo;) amendment of Gov. Code, § 35313, re-
to protests against annexation of uninhabited territory 
to a city, so as to state ~pecifieally that "value of the territory" 
means value of the land and improvements thereon, was merely 
deelnratory of existing law, and the city council did not err in 
nu1king its detennination, prior to the effective date of such 
amendment, on the basis of value of both land and improve-
ments. 
[10] !d.-Annexation of Uninhabited Territory-Reasonableness. 
-l,n annexation of uninhabited territory to a city which 
violates no express statutory limitation restricting shape, ex-
tPnt or character of the annexed territory is not void for 
unreasonableness merely because it is alleged that the topogra-
phy of the annexed land makes it impo~sible of urban develop-
ment, that its size is out of all proportion to the city's needs, 
that p:ut of the territory is included in a national forest, and 
thnt the land will not lwnefit by inclusion within the city, the 
permissible shape, character or extent of the territory amwx:ed 
being a political question. 
[11] !d.-Annexation of Uninhabited Territory-Validity.-An 
annexation of uninhabited territory to a city was not void as 
fraudulent nhuse of the authority conferred by statute where 
there was no nllegation of violation or evasion of any statu-
tory provision !'Plating to the dctPnninat.ion ot' thP land to be 
;lll!li'XPd. An nssNtion tllat. tlte ('it,v eouueil a;;signed a false 
n•nson l"o1' illl!lexing tl11! l<'rritory :llld an iudeJlnitf' allegation 
See Cal.Jur.2d, Real Property, § 2. 
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[12] !d.-Annexation of Uninhabited Territory-Validity.-The 
motives of: a city council in seeking annexation of uninhabited 
territory to the city cannot be inquired into so as it pro-
eeeded aceord ing io estn h lislwd law. 
[13] Id.-Organization-Boundaries.--::.io one has a vested right 
to be eiHH'r indndcd or excluded from a local governmental 
nnd ttHl of territorial boundaries of n municipal 
~will not ordinarily constitute an invasion of fed-
Pral constitutional 
[14] !d.-Annexation of Uninhabited Territory-Validity.-The 
rule that taxing districts can confer but one readily 
ascertainable benefit pceuliarly advantngeous to property 
within the district and that, if such benefit does not accrue to 
particular land, an assessment of that land to finance the im-
provements amounts to a taking of property without due 
process of law. does not apply with respect to municipal 
corporations whose advantages are general and varied, in-
eluding· the legally pt·esumcd intangible benefits resulting from 
tho privilege of being part of an organized community, and 
hence an annexation to a city of uninhabited t0nitory which 
assertcdly benefits neither the land nor its owners will not 
amount to a taking of property without due process of law. 
[15] Id. -Annexation of Uninhabited Territory- Burdens and 
Benefits.-~Where the burden which a complaining property 
owner nntif'ipatPs from an amwxatiou of uninhnhit0d territory 
to a city is thnt of a general ad valorem property tax imposed 
to support the local govl~rnment, it is not necessary that any 
sp<~cial benefit ac<>ruc to tl1e land by rPnson of the annexatiou. 
[16] Taxation-Validity: Uniformity.-The validity of a city ad 
valorPm tax does not depend on the receipt of some special 
benefit as distinguished from the general benefit to the com-
munity; it is constitutionally sufficient if the tax is uniform 
:md for public purposes in whieh the whole city has an interest. 
[17] Municipal Corporations-Annexation of Uninhabited Terri-
tory-Taxation.-The performance of such ordinary municipal 
services as police and fire protection within the existing bound-
aries of a city together with the prospect that the city, 
consistent ~with its own interests and declared intent, will 
extend those services to uninhahitf•d territory annexed to the 
city, will justify the imposition of taxes and be sufficient to 
satisfy the due process dauses of the state and federal Con-
stitutions. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Hiver-
:;ide County. Hilton H. McCabe, Judge. Affirmed. 
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in qno warranto to v~:st of annrxation 
lllliJJhabited to a . ,fudgment for defendant 
after sustaining demurrer to ;nnended 
leave to amend, affirmed. 
];:dmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Eugene B. Sa<:obs 
Delbert E. \Vong, Deputy Attorneys General, ,Joseph A. 
and E. IN. Cunningham for Appellant. 
,Jerome .I. Bunker, City Attorney, for Respondent. 
SPENCE, J.-'rhis is a proceeding in quo warranto to test 
validity of the annexation of certain "uninhabited" terri-
tory to the city of Palm Springs. Plaintiff's complaint, which 
the invalidity both generally and specifically, was 
found insufficient by the trial court and judg·ment was en-
tered in favor of defendant after a demurrer was sustained 
without leave to amend. 
[1] Quo warranto lies to attack a completed annexation 
proceeding. (A.merican Distilling Co. v. Cdy Council, Sausa-
34 Cal.2d 660, 667 [213 P.2d 704, 18 A.L.R2d 1247].) 
[2] Under existing law, the eomplaint is held sufficient if it 
eharges the usurpation of the franchise in general terms. 
(People v. City of Los Angeles, 133 Cal. 338, 340-341 [65 P. 
7 4H].) [3a] But if the pleader sets out the specific facts 
relied on to show the usurpation, he assumes the burden of 
allegation and proof, and the complaint is subject to general 
demurrer if those facts do not state a causc of action. (Peo-
v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 133 Cal. 338, 341.) [ 4] The 
attorney-general has urged that we revise the existing rules 
and require specific allegations in all cases where the aetion 
brought on relation of private parties. \Ve have de-
termined, however, that this request should more properly 
be addressed to the I,egislature, and that the rules heretofore 
established should govern these proeeedings. [3b] And 
since plaintiff does not contend that any additional grounds 
are available to challenge this annexation, we have con-
eluded that the trial court did not err in denying leave to 
and that plaintiff's cause must stand or fall on the 
basis of the specific grounds alleged. 
'l'be annexation was conducted pursuant to the "Annexa-
t iou of Uninhabited Territory Act of 1939." (Stats. 1939, 
eh. 2H7, p. 1567; now Gov. Code, §§ 35300-35326.) 'l'hat act 
Jlermits a city to annex "contiguous uninhabited territory" 
42 
(Gov. 




' describe the boundaries 
annexed, designate it by an ap-
propriate name, and contain notiee of the time and place 
the legislative body will hear protrsts the annexa-
tion. (Gov. Code, § 35306.) Copies of the resolution must 
he published twice in both eity and eonnty newspapers of 
general circulation, and written uoticc is to be mailed to 
each landowner in the territory at least twl'Hty before 
the first public hearing. (Gov. Code, § :35311.) 
A.ny owner of property within the territory may file writtr'n 
protest at any time before the honr set for heaeing objeetions 
(Gov. Code, § 35312), and the legislative body must hear and 
pass upon all protests so made. Code, § :3531:3.) If 
the owners of one-half of the value of the territory protest, 
further proceedings shall not be taken. (Gov. Code, § 3531:3.) 
But if sufficient valid protests arc not made, thr legislative 
body must approve or disapprove the annexation, by or-
dinance. (Gov. Code, § 35314.) '!'he annexation is eom-
plete when a eertified copy of the ordinance i8 transmitted 
to the secretary of state and filed by him. (Gov. Code, 
§ § 35316, 35:318.) 
Plaintiff commenced this action after the annexation pro-
ceedings had been completed. 'l'he complaint alleged that 
the annexation was void because ( 1) written notice of the 
annexation proceedings was not given to one owner of land 
within the territory; (2) the notiec and hearing given the 
other landowners did not satisfy the statutory requirements; 
(3) protests submitted to the city eouucil deprived it of 
jurisdietion to annex the territory; and because ( 4) the 
annexation is unreasonable; (5) amounts to a fraudulent 
abuse of the statute; and ( 6) operates to talw property without 
due process of law. 
[5] First: PLaint,iff alleges that the Southern Pacific 
Company, an owner of land in the territory, was not served 
with written notice of its opportunity to protest tl1e annexa-
tion, and contends that this omission deprived the city council 
of jurisdt:ction to annex the tm·ritory. As previously noted, the 
statute requires that notice be given by publication and by 
mail. (Gov. Code, § 35:311.) Plaintiff does not allege that 
the city failed to mail written notice to all other landowners 
in the annexed territory nor does plaintiff allege that the 
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as to publieation of notice were not 
Under these eircumstances, the failure to allege 
Southern Pacific Company did not acquire knowledge 
contents of the published notice, that it did not ap-
thc that it desired to protest, or that it:s pro-
not in faet considered, renders this elairn 
De Luca v. Boarcl of Supervisors, 
609-GJl P.2d 3U5].) If' it may 
sai<l that the lang·uagc fonnd in In re Central Irrigation 
117 Cal. :382 [49 P. 354,], carries any implication 
10 the contral'y, 1re do not deem it applicable to the situation 
Jn that ease the :;;tatute provided for but one form 
wllid1 was notice by publication, and the published 
was held to be fatally defcetive. Here there was merely 
a failurE' to giH JJotiee to a single 1andowuer by one of two 
methods. Ful'i hermore, it should be noted that the 
deeision in the C<>ut raJ T rrigation District ease has been 
limited iu its applieation to its preci:;;e facts. (See 
Y. City of Montfbello, 192 Cal. 489, 493 (221 P. 207].) 
Second: Plaintiff claims !hat 11o11e of the landowners 
u·uc a[(ordecl the kind of notice or right of hearing required 
by the act. This contention is based on the city's rt'fusal to 
r·JJtertain either oral protests or written protests not tendered 
uutil afi.er the hearing had commenced. Since the notice 
of hearing speeificd that the council would hear and de-
l ermine "all written protests filed with the City Council 
to the hour'' set for hearing, no complaint can bE' made 
c,f adequaey if the city was justified in rejeeting all pro-
te~ts not submitted in the form and at the time specified. 
The statutory language is elear. Section 85312 of 
tlH' Government Cod(; provides: "At any time before the 
hom set for hE'aring ohjectionil, any owner of property within 
the territory may file uTittcn protest .... " (Emphasis added.) 
Plaintiff seeks to giYe a permissive reading to this section, 
on the word "ma)'." But the section mt'aus cxaetly 
what it says~only 1uitten protests filed before the hour 
se1 for hearing need be considered. The section is permissive 
to the extent that no one is required to file a protest. 
.A other eonstrm·tion wonld re11der meaningless the limiting 
words in the ucxt :mceeeding seetion, which requirE'S "the 
body . . . [to] l1ear and pass upon all protests 
so mark." (Em]Jhasif\ added; Gov. Code, § 35313.) 'rhe lan-
guage in Path v. Cdu of Long Beach, 125 Cal.App.2d 520, 
528 [270 P.2d 868 j, is not inconsistent with this position, 
44 PEOPLE 1'. CITY OF PAL:\f SPRil'\GS [51 C.2d 
since the issue in that ease was whether certain protests had 
been prematurel.v signed. 
Third: Plaintiff asserts that even without the oral and 
tardy written !her!' u·cre sufficient l'illi:d protests to 
bar proceedings. At the time of the hearing, the 
applieable eotle sertion provided in part: "If protest is made 
by Hw owner;.; of mw-half of the 1•alue of ll1e territory as shown 
tlw last <'qualized assessml'nt roll, or if protest is mad;) 
and private O\YIH'l'S Njrtal to one-half of the value 
territory proposed to be annexed as determined by 
the body, fnrthN· pro(:CC(1ings shall not be taken." 
(Bmphasis added; Cov. Code, § :)5in:3.) ln 19iJG, after this 
annexation was ('Ompleted, the 1Jegis1ature amended this see-
tion by adding, ''As usrd in this artiele, 'value of the territory' 
means the valne of the land and improvc>ments tlwreon.'' 
(Stats. 1~l55, eh. 19-±8, § 5, p. 3580.) 
Plaintiff conteJH1s that the eity erred in its tletermination 
that \Hittc11 proic'sts filed prior to the hearing represented 
less than "one-half of the value of the territory." Plaintiff 
eoneedes that the city's determination wac; eorrect if the 
eity was entitled to consider the value of both land and im-
provements in determining the :mfficiency of protests. But 
plaintiff eontends that before the 19G5 amendment, "value 
of the territory" meant valnc of the land exelusive of im-
provements, and that this definition must govern these pro-
ceedings. 
Plaintiff points to section 35305 of the Government Code 
as an indication that land values only are to be considered. 
That section provides: "Upon rereiving a written petition 
requesting annexation ... signed by the owners of not less 
thau one-fourth of the land in the territory by area, and by 
assessed value ... , the legislative body shall, without delay. 
pass a resolution giving notiee of the proposed annexation." 
The Si'ctlon does not support plaintiff's position. 
[8] '· IJmHl'' meam.; ''the solid matrrial of the earth'' ( Civ. 
Codr, § 659), and its Yalue does not include the value of 
impro\·crnents the-reon. (Sec Kronsc1· v. County of San 
Rernnrdino, 29 Cal. 2d 766 [178 P.2d 441].) "Value of the 
territory" has not been so interpreted. (See American Dis-
tilling Co. Y. C!ity Coll Sausalito, snpra, 34 Ca1.2d 660, 
GGG [2l:l P.2cl 704, 18 A.TJ.R 2d 1247].) 
Both sed ion 3;')30:) a1Hl ~eetion 35313 \Vere fin;t enacted 
as part of the "Annexation of Uninhabited rrerritory Act of 
19il9" (Stats. 1!)39, c·h. 2D7, §§ :3, 6, p. 1G68) and were added 
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:u llw (;o\.('J'IJJJIP!ll Codr• witJJ only lllinor lll 1!14!!. 
1 :)tats. l!J4!J, (•h. 7U, pp. l2:i-12fi.) [9] Sill('<: t!JP L.•gislatnr.· 
. <'O!lsi.~li'nil.\· reqnir·er1 the petitions to lH• signr•<l hy owners 
f 1101 Je~s tiJall Olle-fonnJJ of the "iand ... by aSS('SSerl 
yalne" (UoY. Coile. § ~l5:lOG), al](l llas at the smue tinh' 
that atluexat ion Jli'Oi'<'l'ilillg-s l1e terminated if pro-
is 1nade IJ)· own1·n; of one-lmlf of the ''y;dne or til<· li'l'l'i-
wry as s!JOwn by the last equalized a:;sessment roll" ({loy. 
§ :33:n:3), it do('S not appear tlwt the two i<'si.s wer,· 
rdc•nded to be equin1lents. \Ve therefore eonc-lnde that the 
1 !!53 amendmeut >Yas merely deelanttory of law, and 
that the eity rounc·il did not err in makin>~ itR t1f't(Tmination 
on the basis of the valne of both land and improYr>meni.s. 
[10] F'onrth: Plai!lt iff co11trmls til at the aunexai'ion 1·s 
j•oid brrause it is um·er,smwblr. Plaintiff: admits that the an-
nexation violates 110 express statutory limitation restrieting 
1 he shape, extent or (:baraeter that annexed territory may 
take. But the annexation is E;aid to be yoid bream;e it is 
um·easonablr in scv(;rnl partieulars. In this n•gard it is 
a1leged that the topography of the annexrtl lallil wakes it 
mpossihlc of urhan c1eYelopment, that its size is out of all 
proportion to the eity 's needs, that part oJ' tlw territory is 
indudrd in a Hational forest, and that the lnnd will not 
lH'lll'fit by inclusion ·within the eity. 
A mere 1:itation of the many eases stating that the -.,-isilom or 
o•x]wdietH·y of parti<'ular annexations is not a .iwlic·;nt ques-
tion (People v. City of Rivr:n;idc, 70 Cal. 461, 4G:3 [D P. 6G2, 
11 P. 73Dl; Johnson Y. City of San Pablo, 132 Cal.App.2d 
,+-t7. 4.)7 [28:3 P.2d 57]; People v. Tmc:z of Corte Jlac!aa. 
] ],) CaL\pp.2d :32, 47 [231 P.2d 988]; City of Dmlingamc 
. County of San Mateo, 90 Cal.App.2d 70;), 7 J.l [203 P.2d 
) ; that the eourls can go 110 further than to see tlrat the 
existin;:; hny is obiic>rwd (People v. City of Rin:rside, supra; 
y Y. City of C(n•ina, 1:1:3 Cal.App.2d 7.f,J, 73:3 [283 P.2d 
rq I ; JollliSO!l \'. City of San Pablo. SU}JJ'a; People \'. Town 
r'ortc i11ar7cra, supra; Potter v. City Councif, 102 Cal.App. 
2d 141, 14:-i-14() [227 P.2d 25]; Cily of Burli11gamc v. County 
of Ban 11falco, wpra); and that, subjed only to express statu-
tory limita tious, the permissible shape, eharaeter or extent 
of the territory annexed is a politieal question (People v. 
City of Los Angeles, 154 Cal. 220, 224-225 [f!7 P. 311]; People 
Y Tou•n of Corte Jladcra, supra. Ht pp. 4G-47; st>c also Ro.rJers 
. Board of Directors of Pasadc1;a, 218 Cal. 221, 223 [22 P.2d 
; People v. Toll'n of Loyalton, 147 CaL 774, 777-778 [82 
46 PEOPLE l'. .2d 
P. ), is snffi(oit>nt to show that 
support in the law of this state. 
Mon'OYer, the J,rgislature, not uumindful or tlle peeuliar 
annexations attempted by some cities Bnrlin-
game v. County of San Mateo, supra, 90 CaLApp.2d 705 fa 
horseshoe shaped territory 100 feet wide, fret lcmg, and 
enclosing 730 acres of unincorporated ) , has made 
no attempt to state a general rule governing the shape, ehar-
acter or extent of territory that may be annexed; rather, 
its efforts have been confined to curbing particular abuses of 
the annexation acts. e.g., Gov. Code, §§ 35002.5, 35326.) 
By this treatment of the problem, the Lrgislature has mani-
fested an intent that the courts should continue to treat these 
questions as political in nature, and that an annexation should 
not be declared invalid unless some express statutory pro-
vision has been violated. It follows that plaintiff's attempt 
to establish this annexation as unreasonable does not state a 
eause of action. 
[11] Fifth: Pla:intijf claims that the annexation 1:s void as 
a fmuclulent abuse of the cmthority conferTcd by stat~ttc. 
It has been indicated that the courts have, and in appropriate 
cases will exercise, the power to set aside a purported an-
nexation where there has been a fraudulent abuse of the 
statute. (City of Anaheim v. City of li'ullcrton, 102 Cal.App. 
2c1 395 [227 P.2d 494]; People v. City of Jllon!crcy Park, 40 
Cal.App. 715 f181 P. 825]. See also Rogers v. Bom'd of 
Dir·cctors of Pasadena, supra, 218 Cal. 221, 223; People v. 
City of Los Angeles, supra, 154 Cal. 220, 224; .I ohnson v. 
City of San Pablo, supra, 132 Cal.App.2d 447, 456-457; 
People v. Town of Corte lJiarlcra, supra, 115 CaLApp.2d 
32, 44.) 
But plaintiff's complaint does not present such a case. 
The allegation of fraudulent abuse is based in large part on 
the identical facts used as a predieate for the charge of un-
reasonableness. Since there was no violation or evasion of 
any statutory provision relating to the detenni nation of the 
laud to be annexed, plaintiff's allegations in that regard do 
not establish a fraudnleut abuse of the statute. 'l'he assertion 
that the city council assigned a false reason for annexing 
the territory and the indefinite allegation that the real reason 
was to subject the land to municipal taxes are conelusionary 
and, in any event, add nothing to the complaint. [12] The 
motives of the eity council cannot be inquired into so long 
as it proceeded according to established law. (.I ohnson v. 
PEoPLE v. CrTY or r ALM SPRrNas 47 
C.2d 38; 331 P.2d 4 i 
supra, 1:12 Cal.App.2d 447, 457; People v. 
supra, 115 Cal.App.2d 32, 47; City of 
San supra, 90 Cal.App.2d 
cmdcnds that the aunc:x:ation will 
u;ithout due process law. There 
no merit in t11is contention. No one has a vested right 
o lH~ either ineluded or exe1uded from a local governmental 
Y. Hoard 145 Cal.App.2d 8, 11 
) , and the fixing of territorial boundaries of 
c·.orporation will not ordinarily constitute an 
federal constitutional rights. (Hunter v. City 
207 U. S. 161, 178-179 [28 S.Ct. 40, 52 L.Ed. 
01]; Forsyth Y. Hammond, 166 U.S. 506, 518 [17 S.Ct. 
41 L.Ed. 1095]; Kelly v. City of Pittsburgh, 104 U. S. 
80-81 [26 L.Ed. 6fl8].) 
Bnt plaintiff contcmds that neither the land nor its owners 
will he benefited "by inc.Jusion within ... the city" nor 
will the land or landowners receive ''any of the b<~nefits 
eustomarily resulting to property and property owners" with-
in a munieipality; and that the burden of municipal taxes, 
whid1 is certain to follow the annexation, will amount to a 
of property without due process of law. Plaintiff 
relies on JJiylcs Salt Co. v. Iberia Draina.r;e Dist., 239 U.S. 
478 [36 S.Ct. 204, 60 L.Ed. 392]. In that ('ase the plaintiff 
(•ha1Jenged the validity of a tax imposed by a special taxing 
district to finance the construction and maintenance of a 
drainage system. It was held that plaintiff's land could not 
be taxed sinee it would not be benefited by the proposed 
improvements. 
[14] That case is readily distinguishable and the rule 
emmciated is not applieable here. (Morton Salt Co. v. City 
South Hutchinson, 177 F.2d 889, 891-892; State ex rel. Pan 
AmeTican Production Co. v. Texas City, -- Tex. ·-- [303 
R.\Y.2<l 7RO, 783], appeal dismissed per curiam, 3f)5 F.S. 608 
S.Ct. G33, 2 l.J.E(l.2d 523].) Special taxing districts can 
('Onfer but one readily astertaiuable benefit peculiarly advan-
to the property Yrithin the district and if it does not 
}l!'<~nw to padi('ular land, an assessment of that ]and to 
fiJJ:mvc the impron"ments amonnts to a taking of property 
wi1l1oHt due Jll'OC'rm; of law. But the rule is otherwise with 
rrsped to muui('ipal eorporations >vho,;e advantages are geu-
l'l'al and Yaried, iu('luc1ing "the legally presumed intangible 
he1wfits rrsnlting from the priYilege of being part of an organ-
48 [51 C.2d 
izcd Salt Co. v. City of South Htdchin-
son, supra, 177 F.2d at p. 
[15] Since the burden which plaintiff anticipates is that of 
a ad valorem property tax imposed to support the 
loeal government, it is not necessary that any special benefit 
aeerue to the land by reason of the annexation. (GUy of Santa 
Rosa v. Coulta, 58 CaL 537; see also Town Di:wn v. Mayes, 
72 Cal.1G6, 168 P. 471].) [16] The validity of sueh a tax 
doc's not depend on the receipt of some special benefit as dis-
tinguished from the general benefit to the community. (M em-
is & Charleston Ry. Co. v. Pace, 282 U.S. 241, 246, 249 [51 
S.Ct. 108, 75 L.Ed. 315, 72 A.hR. 1096] ; St. Lm1/is & S. W. 
Ry. Co. v. Nattin, 277 U.S. 157, 159 [48 S.Ct. 438, 72 hEd. 
830] ; JJlorton Salt Co. v. City of Sonth Hutchinso11, supra, 
177 .F'.2d 889, 8n-892.) "[I] t is constitntionally sufficient if 
the taxes are uniform and are for public pnrposes in which 
the whole city has an interest." (ll1odon Salt Co. v. City of 
South Ilntchinson, supra, 177 P.2d 889, 891.) [17] 'rhus 
the performance of such ordinary municipal services as police 
and fire protection within the existing boundaries of the city 
(sec Kelly v. City of Pittsbtagh, supra, 104 U.S. 78, 82) to-
gether with the prospect that the city, consistent with its own 
interests and declared intent, will extend those services to 
the annexed territory, will justify the imposition of taxrs and 
will be sufficient to satisfy the due process clauses of the 
state (Anaheim S1tr;ar Co. v. Cmtnty of Oranr;e, 181 Cal. 212, 
217 [188 P. 809] ; City of Santa Rosa v. Conlter, 58 Cal. 537) 
and federal constitutions. (Kelly v. City of Pittsbnrgh, snpra, 
104 lT.S. 78, 82; Anaheim S11gar Co. v. County of Ornnge, 
snpra; see also Bailey v. Collector of Manasqnan, 53 N.J.L. 
162, Hi3-166 [20 A. 772].) 
Since plaintiff's specific allegations do not establish the 
invalidity of the annexation, it is unnecessary to consider the 
effect of the '' I<'irst Validating Act of 1955'' ( Stats. 1955, ch. 
11, p. 454) which purported to validate "all aets and proceed-
ings heretofore taken by any public body under any law, or 
under color of any law, for the annexation or inclusion of 
territory into any sueh public body. " (Stats. 1955, eh. 
11, § 4, p. 456.) 
'l'he judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C .• T., Shenk, J., 'I'raynor, J., and MeComb, J., con-
curred. 
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annexation violates cd eour·epts of 
of Jaw. The piYotal inequity is this: '!'he Pohn 
Couneil ha,; used power dcleg;att•d to it by 
ure to rnguegc~ territory to wllieh it is not po-
\Yhirh will not benefit from iDrJusion 
and whit~h will tlwreaJ'ie.r be subjeeJ to taxation 
the (·it;v·. 'l'!J(~ e1eetoes of Palm 
Thet·pfore it i:s only to thrir 
,·ontroi and ueed lw loyal onl,v to 1hrie interests to remain 
Tlw ownet·s oE proximate nninhabitPd lands may 
exl'rt llO eontrol OV('r the eomwil before or after anJJcxation. 
Tllt• will bendit from expansion of poliee t:ontrol 
" 'rlw Jamlo>vllers will be snhjeeted to taxrs 
nnd ordinam•es. The majority of this eourt holds no 
benPfit need <t<,erne to the landowners from tllis amwxation 
and the t:omplaint alleges no11e will. The eonflid in interest 
overt. 
,Justifieaiion of 1his annexation violates the axiom of Anglo-
American juri:-;prudenec that one may not be the judge of 
own cause (Coke Upon Littleton, § 212; Bonhrrm 's Cnsc 
! 1()]0], 77 Eng. Hcp. 646; Dam v. Sauadgc [1610], 80 Eng. 
2:35; Cooley, Constit ntiollal Limitations ( 2d ed.), 508; 
sre 11. ] ) aJJd is analogous to "taxation without representa-
1ion.'11 Ordinantes delegating powet· oYer an individual's 
to 1wighboring property owners are unconstitu-
: ional heeanse the po\n'r mny b" ilrhitrarily used and be-
;·fmse of JlOssiblt• (·.ollflieting- intcn~sts. (8('(1/tlr; Title Trn .. d 
r'o. v. Ro/Jauc, 278 U.S. J1G [4D S.Ct. 50, 7:3 L.I<Jd. 210]; 
Fubanl.: ''· Citu Rich 226 U.S .. B7 [:l~1 S.Ct. 76, .)7 
L.Ed. FiG, 42 L.lLA.N.S. l12:lJ.) Similar California :-:tatut0s 
nn· saYed beeau.~e the eonrts will interpret hm·s to eonfonn to 
(·omditutional safegnarch againsi arbitrarinrss and eompel 
;Hilllillistratiye offi<·,•rs to ad aer·ordin;rl.\· ( .Yrtr l'ork r·x: rel. 
l.ichermau \'. Vnn de Carr, HW F. S. 5:)2 126 S. Ct. 144, 50 
d~d. 3();)]; J:ultrnrorth v. Bo!td, 12 Cal.2d 140, 14!) [82 
.2d ·±:lJ. 12() .A.ldL S:lSl; l'r:oplc \'.Globe Orain ,(· Jlilf. Co ... 
_11 Cnl. 121, J:2S P. :lJ; fiayiord v. City of Pasadcua, 
lrn .. e sole means ol' preventing nn ntnll:xation js. not]('c to t.1w int('n~sh'(l 
l:lndowJJC•fs au(i tJ1cir wrjttcn rrot.c,:.<t. The protcdjolls of an clec·1jon are 
they aru pl o1·ided where iJJ]JaiJitcd tcnitory is 
(Cm·. Coile, H :;~JOII3.')J:JH.) Jn tl!c instant ca:w 
rnvncrs de:-;iriJlg' to proh,si were a0uled that -riglJt by an ::unlliguous 
Aatute intcrvretcrl incorrectly ngain8t tltem. 
GO [ 31 C.:2d 
175 Cal. 433, 437 [166 P. 348] ). A city council may not 
exercise its discretion arbitrarily (Roussey v. City of Burlin-
oame, 100 Cal.App.2d 321 [223 P.2d 517]) and eourt>; re-
view facts entering into a council's decision and overrule it 
if it is arbitrary. (Bleucl v. City of Oakland, 87 Cal.App. 
594 [262 P. 477] .) Because the Legislature's power to annex 
land to municipalities-ergo to tax and police-is delegated 
to a body with interests conflicting with those over whom the 
power may be used, the exercising body has a position of trust 
analogous to a fiduciary. The law demands the careful and 
fair use of such power. Yet this court again declares that 
only fraud suffices to nullify annexation proceedings. (See 
People v. City of Los Angeles, 154 Cal. 220, 224 [97 P. 311] ; 
People v. Town of Loyalton, 147 Cal. 774, 778 [82 P. 620] .) 
The annexation also runs afoul of another constitutional 
rule: \Vhere a state Legislature delegates power to form and 
define a special district, a hearing is required on the issue 
of whPther or not particular land is benefited by inclusion. 
(Chesebro v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 306 
U. S. 459, 464 [59 S. Ct. 622, 83 r_..Ed. 921] ; Brownino v. 
Hooper, 269 U. S. 396 [46 S. Ct. 141, 70 L.Ed. 330]; Fall-
brook lrr. Dist. v. Bmdley, 164 U. S. 112, 167 [17 S. Ct. 56, 
41 I .. Ed. 369]; Miller & Lux v. Board of Supe1·visors, 189 
Cal. 254 [ 208 P. 304].) I,and not benefited may not be 
included. (Fallbrook Irr. Dist. v. Bradley, supra, 172, 173.) 
It logically follows that a finding of benefit unsupported in 
fact is null, since the hearing would otherwise be a sham. 
'l'his court holds the decision of the municipal body is not 
subject to judicial review. This holding is indefensible. In 
,lfylcs Salt Co. v. Iberia etc. Drainage Dist., 239 U. S. 478 
[36 S. Ct. 204, 60 L.Ed. 392], the court reversed the sus-
taining of a demurrer to a suit to restrain tax sale of land. 
Petitioner's land had been included in a drainage district 
organized pursuant to Louisiana statutes by the police juries 
of the parishes concerned. Petitioner alleged his land did not 
benefit from operation of the district although he had to pay 
taxes to it. The trial court and the r_.ouisiana Supreme Court 
held the inclusion was a legitimate exercise of discretionary 
legislative powers and the courts were not permitted to inter-
vene in the absence of fraud-in effect, that it was a "political 
question.'' '!'he Supreme Court held this was an act of 
confiscation and violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. At 
page 481 the court said the delegation of power to include 
the land in the district was valid but its use which is" palpably 
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and a plain abusn" is ill1~gal. 'i'hm·eforn US\' of thi~ 
pOll'(~!' is not a po1itieal question and a state may not permit 
arbitntr.v exereisl'. Although tlJC instant ease has not 
rNwhed the point of a tax sa.Je, the prinripJe is applieab}e: 
'l'he iuelusion within an iueorporated area of lands not thnreby 
benefited is uneonstitntional. I ean see no difference between 
including land arbitrarily iu a special distriet and in a mn-
ni<ripality. 
'The .instant ease is stronger than the Myles Salt case be-
cause the political body enlarging itself is not politically 
responsible to the territory engorged. 'fhe drainage district 
in 1Iyles Salt was organized by the police juries of the 
parishes in which the land in issue was situated. 
It is important to observe that this case is before ns on 
demurrer since the allegations of the complaint must be as-
sumed true. 'I' he complaint alleges facts which bri ug it w·ithin 
the scope of the Myles Salt rule. It states that the area pro-
posed to be annexed "extends up and along the uortlwm and 
northea~;tern slopes of Mount San ,J aeiuto peak all(l varies iu 
elevation from approximately 700 feet to 4,000 feet. \Vith 
the exception of a few portions totaling an area of approxi-
mately one and a half square miles, the territory ... eonsists 
entirely of precipitous gorges and gullies, high roeky ridges 
and steep rocky slopes, narrow canyons and sandy washes 
subjeet to flash Hoods. \Vith the exception of approximately 
two miles of highway No. 111 ... a short road of approxi-
mately two miles iu lcmgth in Chino Canyon and one in Snow 
Creek Canyou, approximately one and a half miles long, there 
are no pnblie roads or other means of aceess into the area. 
Up to approximately 80 per cent of the total area is inacees-
sible on foot without special mountain climbing equipment 
or without taking an extremely circuitous route .... 
"That it is not true that there are indicationf:l that in the 
near future or any other time said territory sought to be 
annexed will be improved with buildings and other strnetnres 
suitable for residential development or for commercial devel-
opment to serve the alleged tramway development or any 
other development or purpose .... That an extPnsion of flre 
and pollee or flre or police protection by defendant city to 
the territory proposed to be annexed is and will contiHue to 
be for a1l practieal purposes impossible beeause of its great 
area and the character of the terrain, as herein above allegpcl 
aud said territory will not benefit by any attempted extension 
of snch protection by defendant. That at none of the times 
52 C.2d 
Jwr-ein or in the 
foresceabh; future any ,;aid pro· 
tramway ref<ol'I'<'d to in said onlinanee \YOtdd he 01' will 
be (•onstrueted. En•n if eom;tnwted, an.v st rudnre or sLruc· 
turcs used in (~Onllcction therewith would oceupy only an 
small portion of Chino Canyon and \YOuld not be 
nrbau in eharadcr and 'rould in 110 malllJel' affeet or alter 
the remainiug portions of tlw 
Hexed .... 
to he an-
"That defendant will not and caunot either now m· in the 
foreseeable future extend to the property withiu the territory 
proposed to be annexed, except that adjaccut to existing roads, 
any of the municipal services or advantages customarily sup-
plies [siel to property within the municipal boundries [sie] 
of ineorporated towns aud cities, nor will at any such times 
the property or the property owners within the territory ... 
be in any manner benefited Ly inclusion within the boundries 
[sie] of defendant city. '!'hat defendant nevertheless pro-
poses to subject all taxable property within said territory to 
taxation for 1mmieipal purposes. That the proposed annexa-
tion of said territory is unreasonable and unwarranted. in that 
and for the reasons that said territory is unsuitable for and 
impossible of urban development and uses and is not author-
ized by the Jaws of the State of California relating to the 
annexation of unillhabited territory. 'l'hat the proposed and 
attempted annexation of said territory by defendant under 
the provisions of sueh laws because of the fads herein alleged, 
operates as au attewp1ed fraudulent use of slwh laws in view 
of the dwraet('r of the terrain and extent of the area indnded 
within said vroposed annexation .... 
'''I' hat said proposed annexation is void for the rem:on that 
it would subjed the property and property OWJWI'S 1vithin the 
territory proposed to be annexed to taxatiolJ for munie i pal 
pn1·pos(·,; without giYing to snell JlrOJl<>rty all(1 owners any 
of the bPnPfits <·ustomarily n':mliing to Jll'Opcrty and property 
omwrs within the boull(1ries [sie] of a munie.ipal <~orporation 
anll 1nmld tlwreforc operate to take propt~rty of suc·h owners 
1ritlwut due process of law and without compelL~alin;L .. " 
'l'his complai11t alleges every fact held neeec;sary for iu-
jnndiw relit'f in Myles Salt Co. v. Iberia clc. Dminagc Dist., 
supra, at 484. Condusions of fraud, 110 benefit to the land 
annexed (see the Myles Salt ease, supra, at 484-485), and no 
sufficient reason for annexation are sustained by fads also 
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could not be more concretely formed 
,without pleading evidentiary facts. 
These facts must be emphasized as they brillg the instant 
within the JYiyles Salt rnle rather than that of St. Louis 
d': W. Ry. Co. v. 277 U.S. 157 S.Ct. 438, 72 
L.Ed. , eited by the majority. In the Nattiu case, a 
and a line of tra(•k owned hy plaintiff railroad lay 
within a roall distriet ereaied by the parish jury. 'l'he 
was to the terl'itory l11eluded 
'Within the road distrid. The railroad eomplaiued that it 
would derive no benefit ft"om inelusion in the road distriet, 
and that eollstrurtion of rertain proposed roads would be 
deleterious to it. However, there was no sug-
gestion that the police jury gerrymandered the road district 
to include the railroad's property for taxation. It appears 
to have been included fortuitously. The same may be said of 
the area in issue in State ex rel. Pan American Production Co. 
v. Texas City, -- Tex. -- [303 S.W.2d 780], appeal dis-
missed 355 U.S. 603 [78 S.Ct. 533, 2 hEd.2d 523]. In fact, 
the railroad complains of a road which will parallel one of its 
lines, implying that that particular track was included simply 
because a road was to be built there. This factual context 
vindicates the rule that an ad valorem tax need not confer 
special benefits upon those paying it. To prorate taxes for 
road construction among taxpayers according to the benefits 
each derives is obviously impossible.2 
These facts contrast with those in Myles Salt which also 
involved an ad valorem tax. The Myles Salt Company owned 
an island of 175 feet elevation surrounded by bayous. Across 
the bayous lay lowlands of 15 feet elevation. Drainage dis-
triets were needed in this part of Louisiana to remove waters 
from the lowlands into the bayous. However, the elevation of 
the company's island made erosion, not drainage, a serious 
peoblem. Inclusion of the island in the drainage district (:ould 
not be defended on any prac.tical ground. It was gerry-
mandered to provide a tax source. i\ not her classic example 
is found in Hines v. Clarendon Levee Dist., 264 F. 127. 
In the instant case the eomplaint alleges the same type of 
gerrymandering as in the Myles Salt case. 'rhe need for fin•, 
poliee ancl other JI\Ulli('ipal sen·i<:es in the iPITitory proposc·d 
for annexation is about as beneficial as drainage in the ]\lyles 
2 These fnets are stnted in 81. Louis 9· 8. W. Ry. Co. v. Nattin, 27 F.2d 
766, which wns the same case in a three-judge district court. 
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Island. That being included in a municipality is of itself a 
blessing is a gross fiction. School, police and other necessary 
public facilities are provided by the county in a manner better 
suited to solve the problems of rural society. To apply urban 
rules and techniques to rural problems is inane at best. 'l'he 
local political organization of such areas is provided by 
county governments. 
The cases cited by the majority against petitioner's due 
process contention do not face the instant problem. Com-
plainant's land in Kelly v. City of Pittsburgh, 104 U.S. 78 
[26 L.Ed. 658], was placed within Pittsburgh by the state 
Legislature. (See Kelly v. City of Pittsburgh, 85 Pa. 170 
[27 Am.Rep. 633].) This act was not challenged. 
The same defect renders inapposite City of Santa Rosa v. 
Coultet·, 58 Cal. 537,3 Town of Dixon v. JJiayes, 72 Cal. 166 
[13 P. 471] ; and Memphis & Charleston Ry. Co. v. Pace, 282 
U.S. 241 [51 S.Ct. 108, 75 L.Ed. 315, 72 A.L.R. 1096]. 
lltm·ton Salt Co. v. City of South Htttchinson, 177 F.2d 889, 
involved taxation of land which was already within the city 
when plaintiff's factory was built. There was no issue of 
annexation in the case. 
Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U.S. 506 [17 S.Ct. 665, 41 L.Ed. 
1095], held (1) the federal courts had no power over the 
case because the same cause was pending in the state courts; 
and (2) the lower federal court had improperly undertaken 
to interpret state law to determine the case. Language at page 
518 implies that constitutional rights may be infringed by a 
state's creation or alteration of municipal boundaries. 
The plaintiff in Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 
[28 S.Ct. 40, 52 L.Ed. 151], merely attacked the state statute 
delegating power to the electorate of one city to in effect 
ingest another. The court rejected this. The importance of 
this distinction is clear upon comparing this case with the 
Myles Salt case at pages 484-485. The arbitrary use of the 
power was not attacked. Also (1) there were no facts showing 
the new municipality would not be of some benefit to com-
plainants; (2) the facts indicated merely that plaintiffs 
would not benefit proportt'onately, but did not show they 
would not benefit at all; (3) the electors of the two commu-
nities voted for the unification. The issue of the validity of a 
state statute was before the United States Supreme Court in 
State ex rel. Pan American Production Co. v. Texas City, 355 
•see Stats. 1875-76, ch. 108, p. 251, at 252. 
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S.Ct. 5:3:3,2 Id~d.2d 52:3]. 'l'he fita1c appca7crl the 
decision of the 'i'cxas Supreme Court under U.S.C.A. title 28, 
seetion 1257(2). 'rhis raised the issue of the validity of the 
statute pnrsuant to which Texas City expanded itself. This 
pht(·ed the ease under the aegis of Hunter v. City of Pitts-
burgh, supra/ since the validity of the statute was also there 
attacked. State acts pursuant to a valid statute may only be 
attacked by errtiorari pursuant to U.S.C.A. title 28, section 
1257, subdivision ( :3). 5 This distinction is noted in Myles 
Salt whieh states that such statutes themselves are valid al-
though state action pursuant to them may be unconstitutional. 
'l'he 'l'rxas City case is also different from the instant one in 
that it went to trial and judgment was entered against peti-
tioners. (See State ex rel. Pan American Production Co. v. 
'l'c.x:as City ('rex.Civ.App.), 295 S.W.2d 697, at 699.) 
The question in Anaheim Sugar Co. v. County of Orange, 
181 Cal. 212 [18:3 P. 809], coneerned the proportion of bene-
fits received, not the absence of benefits. The proeeedings for 
the organization of a road district were held invalid in that 
ease. 
Bailey v. Collector of Manasquan, 5:3 N .• J.r_,. 162 [20 A. 
772], was decided in 1890, before the United States Supreme 
Court eases upon which this dissent rests, were decided. Al-
though there may be no vested right to be excluded from a 
governmental unit (Peart v. Board of Supervisors, 145 Cal. 
App.2d 8, 11 [:301 P.2d 874]) there is a right to due process 
in annexation proceedings. 
The doctriue that the permissible shape, character or extent 
•Although U.S.C.A. title 28, section 2103, provides that an appeal 
improvidently taken may be considered as a petition for certiorari, it 
must not be assumed that the attorneys for tho State of Texas followed 
an incorrect procedural path of attack. 'l'herefore it appears the statute 
itself was questioned. 
5 U.S.C.A. title 28, section 1257, provides in part: 
'' J<'inal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State 
in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by tho Supreme Court 
as follows: ... 
"(2) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a statuto 
of any state on tlJC ground of its being repugnant to the Constitt1tion, 
treaties or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of its 
validity. 
"(3) By writ of certiorari, whore the validity of a treaty or statute 
of the United States is drawn in question or where the validity of a 
State statute is drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant 
to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, or where 
any title, right, privilege or immunity is specially set up or claimed 
under the Constitution, treaties or statutes of, or commission held or 
authority exercised under, the United States.'' 
I .11 c ~t! 
;j po]ilit•;il lj\if'StioJJ Hl'O~!' Ill i'llSI'S 
invn1Ying· iJJi·orporH1ioJI Y. 
11d illllll'X111 ion ol' i11llahited al'l'lh_ 
rf-cl"rs u( l'usadr illl, :.::18 C:ll. 2:21 1'.:2d ;-JO:l l: l'cojile Y. 
i.os A supra.) !Jl<·orporation i'l'(jllin•s an dee-
tion iu whii·h a of the elc1•1ors in the area lo be 
mu:'t vote for Por annexation of 
mhabited territor,\·, a majority of eledors of tlw munieipalit.'· 
aud a majority of those in the tenitory to be amwx1'd must 
vote for annexation. 'l'o vitiate this, a court would have to 
eontravene the ·w.ill of an electorate. In eharaetl'rizing the 
question "politieal," the court in People v. City of Los An-
supra, dwelt at length upon the role of the voters. 'rhe 
doetrine \HIS improperly extended to annexations of unin-
habited land, concerning >Yhieh no eledion is held, in City of 
Burlinyanw v. Connty of San Mateo, 90 CaLApp.2d 705 [20:3 
P.2d 807]. At pages 709-710 tllc ('OUl't quoted I'cople v. City 
of Los Angeles, supra, for this proposition. This court has 
interpreted artide XI, section 6, of the California Constitu-
tion to require thi• Ijegislature to enaet only general laws 
relating to mtmieipal annexations. (People v. Town of On-
tario, 148 Cal. 625, see p. 629 [84 P. 2():')].) 'rhe Legislature 
is naturally ineapable of defining boundaries of particular 
cities by general laws. (Observed iu People v. 'Town of 
(hi/ ario, supra, at 629.) 'rherefore it euacted statutory schemes 
dPlegating to the legislative bodies of the municipalities the 
power to annex uninhabited lands. (Gov. Code, §§ :35000-
:35006; :-:15200-35213: 3:5300-3::5~125.) 'l'his court herdJy makes 
this povver plenary aud subjeet to abmw and arbitrary exPreist? 
without remedy to those \vrouged. The majority of states 
limit arm:oxatioJJS to "reasonable" ones. (2 1\T(:Qnillin, Mu-
nieipal Corporations, 3d eel., p. 322.) California must concur 
or permit eontinued incursions on the right to privati? prop-
erty of her citizens. 
In summary: 
( 1) A municipal legislative body aets as an administrative 
body exereising powers delegated by the state I~egislature 
''"hen it llll!H'xes territory; 
(2) It has a relationship of trust to owners of land pro-
pose\1 for annexation; 
(:3) 'rhese landowners are entitled to a hearing ou the issue 
of b('nefit to their land by annexation and to a finding of 
bem•fit based upon facts; 
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A eourt should overthrow the annexation if the finding 
benefit is or lacking in fadual support; 
( 5) If these elements are not satisfied, the annexation is 
n neonsti tutiona 1. 
The majority has also interpreted an ambiguous statute 
those Govenmwnt Code, seetion il5312, 
''At a11y time brfore ohjeetions, 
n.v owner of prope1·ty within the i may file written 
the annexation. Tlw protest shall state the 
name of the owner of the properly affeeted and tlw description 
and area of the property in general terms.'' 
Seetion il5313 provides: 
''At tbe time set for hearing protests the legislative body 
;.;hall hear and pass npon all protests so made. ff protest is 
made by tlH• owners of one-half of the value of the territory 
as shmn1 by the lm;t equalized assrssmrnt roll, or if protest is 
made publie and private owners equal to one-half of the 
value of the territory proposed to be annexed as determined 
the legislatiye body, further proceedings shall not be 
taken." 
The majority holds that "protests so made" refe1·s to pro-
tests mad<' pursuant to seetion 35312. This con:;truction is un-
JWees~ar.v an<l inconsonant with the aim of the sections. 
Sed ion :\:Jill2 aims to provide a method of protest for land-
owners n:1ahk to attend a hearing. Note, that sedion says: 
"At any time be for<' the honr set for !waring objections .... " 
'J'lJis dearly eontemplates a "hearing'' of objections in add.i, 
1ion io those wriiten. Se•·tion 3G313 says: "At the time set 
foe hrm·ing proiests .... '' If a protest is written it need not 
again be heard. This ekal'ly providrs for a different kind of 
protest. Ji'urther. if sedion 8!i313 is interpreted to mean a 
hearing iR to hr hrld on all written protests, it would require 
;ill property o\\·m•rs filing written p1·otrsts pursuant to seetion 
:J.):312 to appear at the "hearing." Sin(•e man.v- ow1wrs oi 
unin habitrd ]all(h mn:: reside miles away from their property, 
iht>y eonld not. pen;onally appear and present their protests. 
"Protests so nwde" thi·refore refers to protests which are 
"!ware!." ?\o rc·asoH of eouvenit>nce appear;; why protests 
should 110t also he pres('nted at the "time• set for hearing 
protests.'' 
'l'lle First \'alidaiing Ad of J95i) (Stats. 19,)5, ch. 11, p. 
~l:i+; effeeiiw ,January 2R, ]9;)5) pnrporti'il to validate" fa]ll 
ac:ts and pnwecdings hen•tofore taken by any public body 
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under any law, or under color of any law, for the annexation 
or inclusion of territory into any such public body .... " 
( § 4.) Section 6 (d) provides: "This act shall not operate to 
confirm, validate, or legalize any act, proceeding, or other 
matter the legality of which is being contested or inquired into 
in any legal proceeding now pending and undetermined or 
which may be pending and undetermined during the period of 
30 days from and after the effer:tive date of this act. . . " 
(Emphasis added.) 
Paragraph five of the amended complaint alleges that on 
November 5, 1954, the relators filed a complaint in quo war-
ranto in the Superior Court of Riverside County challenging 
the proceedings to annex the territory here in question. De-
fendant's demurrer to this complaint acknowlrdges that this 
action was still pending on March 23, 1956. Since this action 
challenged the legality of the annexation proceedings and was 
pending at the time the First Validating Act became effective, 
the act does not cure any defects which may taint the pro-
"eedings. 
A validating act is impotent to cure the jurisdictional de-
feets alleged in the complaint: (1) The arbitrary finding that 
the territory in question would benefit by annexation; or (2) 
refusal to hear protests of landowners which were not made 
in writing before the time set for protests to be heard. (Miller 
& Lux v. Boa1·d of Supervisors, supra.) 
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the judgment. 
SCHAUER, J.-I concur generally in the view of the law 
as developed in Mr. Justice Carter's dissenting opinion and 
join in the conclusion that the judgment should be reversed. 
